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Optimal Sterilization Policies in
Interdependent Economies
Joseph Daniels
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

In this paper, a two-country leader-follower model with imperfect asset
substitution is used to derive the optimal sterilization coefficients for twocountry flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. It is found that, in general,
incomplete sterilization is optimal. However, both the origin and the type of
macroeconomic shocks the economies experience are important in
determining the appropriate degree of sterilization. We also find that
sterilization policies have spill-over effects (strategic complements) in both
cases. Thus, in a competitive policy-making environment, greater sterilization
by one country leads to greater sterilization by the other country. Further, the
impact of increasing capital market integration is examined in particular. We
show that greater integration compounds this problem, leading to full
sterilization as the optimal outcome under perfect capital mobility.

I. Introduction
Sterilization of foreign exchange operations is a significant
feature of the monetary policies of the industrial countries. Indeed,
routine sterilization is a well-known practice of the Federal Reserve
Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bundesbank. Further, sterilization of
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other country interventions has also been practiced, in particular by
Germany and France. Empirical studies confirm this for most countries,
yielding estimates of a sterilization coefficient greater than zero but
less than one, or full sterilization [Mastropasqua et al. (1988)]. Studies
on the Bundesbank indicate near full, or not significantly different from
full sterilization [Pasula (1994); von Hagen (1989); Obstfeld (1983)].
Herring and Marston (1977) have shown that though
sterilization of foreign exchange operations can afford a degree of
monetary autonomy for a country, it has important consequences for
the stability of reserve flows. In addition, within an exchange rate
agreement, sterilized intervention prevents the correction of domestic
monetary policy and interest rate alignment necessary for stability of
the system. Mastropasqua et al. (1988, p. 283) noted this problem
and characterized EMS member policy making with "somewhat
excessive reliance on sterilized interventions, on occasion with the aim
of rigidly defending a particular exchange rate level, and insufficiently
supportive use of domestic monetary instruments (interest rates)."
Therefore the appropriate degree of sterilization is an important
policymaking issue.
Though optimal foreign exchange intervention policy has
received a great deal of attention in the professional literature
[prominent articles include Gros and Lane (1992); Turnovsky (1985a,
b); Black (1985); Benavie (1983); Canzoneri (1982); Boyer (1978)],
the issue of appropriate sterilization policies is still somewhat
unsettled. This is mainly because most traditional theoretical models
assume perfect capital mobility and, therefore, sterilized foreign
exchange intervention leaves the home country money supply
unchanged and is ineffective.
As a result, one principal area of investigation centers on the
channels by which sterilized intervention may affect the exchange
market. There are two common approaches in which fully-sterilized
intervention can be effective. One is an announcement approach in
which there is asymmetric information or incomplete markets. Here,
the central bank has superior information about economic
fundamentals and signals this information to the public through its
policy actions. The second approach is a portfolio approach, where
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assets are imperfect substitutes internationally, and sterilized
intervention is effective by altering the relative supplies of these
assets. Bordo and Schwartz (1991), and Dominguez and Frankel
(1994) have provided summaries of this and related literature.
Another area of research, which is usually based on a portfolio
approach, allows for variable sterilization and determines the optimal
degree of sterilization and foreign exchange intervention. Examples
here include Benavie and Froyen (1992), Natividad and Stone (1990),
Kenen (1982), and Marston (1980). Only Marston has examined
sterilization in a two-country setting, but this analysis does not include
the real sector. Therefore, what is missing from the literature is a full
analysis of the interaction of sterilization and intervention policies
across countries. This paper attempts to fill this void.
In this paper, the optimal degree of sterilization is derived in a
two-country framework, in which the policymakers attempt to
minimize both the variance of home output (or home output prices)
and the variance of consumer price inflation. The interaction of
sterilization and intervention policies is then examined in this context.
The theoretical model employed here allows for variable sterilization
and is derived from asset models such as Canzoneri (1982) and
Benavie (1983). As bonds are considered imperfect substitutes, even
fully-sterilized intervention can affect the exchange rate.
The optimal sterilization and intervention settings are
determined for two cases: a leader-intervention and a leader-fixedrate case. As in Lane (1989), a unique Nash solution does not exist for
the selection of intervention by both countries. Thus, the leader
country chooses its rule for intervention and the optimal degree of
sterilization is determined, based on this rule. It is found that, in
general, incomplete sterilization is optimal. However, both the origin
and the type of macroeconomic shocks the economies experience are
important in determining the appropriate degree of sterilization. We
also find that sterilization policies have spill-over effects (strategic
complements) in both cases. Thus, in a competitive policy making
environment, greater sterilization by one country leads to greater
sterilization by the other country, generating increased reserves
instability. Further, the impact of increasing capital market integration

Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 49, No. 1 (January 1997): pg. 43-60. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

is examined in particular. We show that greater integration compounds
this, leading to full sterilization under perfect capital mobility.
The following section presents and describes a two-country,
variable sterilization model and provides solutions. In Section III, the
interaction of sterilization and intervention policies is examined within
this model. In Section IV, the optimal solutions are derived for a
flexible rate example and in Section V, for a fixed rate example.
Section VI provides a summary and conclusion.

II. A Model of Interdependent Economies
Our results are derived from a model of two identical economies
with bonds which are imperfect substitutes internationally. The model
is typical of the literature, and the reader is referred to the smalleconomy examples of Benavie (1983) and Natividad and Stone
(1990), and the multiple-country example of Canzoneri (1982).

Model Equations
The following eight-equation structure depicts the home and
foreign markets for goods, money and bonds:

Consumer Prices

1
𝑐𝑡 ≡ 𝛼𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑡 ); 𝛼 > ,
2

(1)

𝑐𝑡∗ ≡ 𝛼𝑝𝑡∗ + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡 ),
(1*)

Aggregate Demand

𝛾𝑡 = 𝑎𝑙 (𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 ) − 𝑎2 [𝑟𝑡 − (𝐸𝑡 𝑐𝑡+1 − 𝑐𝑡 )] + 𝜂𝑡 ; 𝑎1.2
> 0,
(2)
∗
𝛾𝑡∗ = 𝑎1 (𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ) − 𝑎2 [𝑟𝑡∗ − (𝐸𝑡 𝑐𝑡+1
− 𝑐𝑡∗ )] + 𝜂𝑡∗

(2*)
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Aggregate Supply

𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎3 (𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡 ) + 𝜌𝑡 ; 𝑎3 ≥ 0,
(3)

𝑦𝑡∗

𝑎3 (𝑝𝑡∗

=

−

𝐸𝑡−1 𝑝𝑡∗ )

+

𝜌𝑡∗
(3*)

Money Demand

𝑚𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑎4 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 ; 𝑎4 ≥ 𝑂,
(4)

𝑚𝑡∗

−

𝑝𝑡∗

𝑦𝑡∗

=

−

𝑎4 𝑟𝑡∗

+

𝜇𝑡∗
(4*)

Bond Demand

𝑏𝑡 = 𝑔1 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑔2 [𝑟𝑡∗ + (𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡 )] + 𝑔3 (𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡∗ ) + 𝑔4 𝜉𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡 ; 𝑔1,2,3,4 > 0,
(5)

𝑏𝑡∗

𝑔1 𝑟𝑡∗

=

− 𝑔2 [𝑟𝑡 − (𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑡+ 1 − 𝑒𝑡 )] + 𝑔3 (𝑦𝑡 +
− 𝜇𝑡∗

𝑦𝑡∗ )

− 𝑔4 𝜉𝑡
(5*)

Money Supply Rules

𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡−1 + Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑓𝑡∗ + Δ𝑑𝑡
(6)

𝑚𝑡∗

=

∗
𝑚𝑡−1

+

Δ𝑓𝑡∗

− ∆𝑓𝑡 +

∆𝑑𝑡∗
(6*)

∆𝑓𝑡 = −𝜃1 (𝑒𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑒𝑡 ),
(7)

∆𝑓𝑡∗

=

𝜃1∗ (𝑒𝑡

− 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑒𝑡 ),
(7*)

∆𝑑𝑡 = −𝜃2 (∆𝑓𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑡∗ ),
(8)
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∆𝑑𝑡∗ = −𝜃2∗ (∆𝑓𝑡∗ − ∆𝑓𝑡 ),
(8*)
where home (foreign) variables and policy parameters are non-asterisk
(asterisk), with
𝑦𝑡 ≡ log of real output,
𝑝𝑡 ≡ log of home output price level,
𝑒𝑡 ≡ the log of the exchange rate, measured as units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency,
𝑚𝑡 ≡ log of the nominal money stock,
𝑟𝑡 ≡ log of home output price level,
𝑓𝑡 ≡ log of the stock of foreign exchange reserves valued at a
constant rate and denominated in a common accounting
standard,
𝑑𝑡 ≡ log of domestic credit denominated in a common
accounting standard,
𝐸𝑡+𝑗 ≡ expectations operator, conditional on information dated
time 𝑡 + 𝑗,
𝜂𝑡 ≡ home output demand disturbance, with 𝐸(𝜂𝑡 = 0) and
𝐸(𝜂𝑡 )2 = 𝜎𝜂2 ,
𝜌𝑡 ≡ home output supply disturbance, with 𝐸(𝜌𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜌𝑡 )2 =
𝜎𝜌2 ,
𝜇𝑡 ≡ exogenous home bond to home money portfolio shift, with
𝐸(𝜇𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜇𝑡 )2 = 𝜎𝜇2 ,
𝜉𝑡 ≡ exogenous foreign bond to home bond portfolio shift, with
𝐸(𝜉𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜉𝑡 )2 = 𝜎𝜉2 ,
𝑏𝑡 ≡ flow demand for home bonds, denominated in a common
accounting standard.
All variables are normalized around trend, and stochastic disturbances
are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated.
Equations (1) and (1*) define the consumer price index for each
economy, where a represents the weight on consumption of home
goods. Equations (2) and (2*) are the equilibrium conditions for home
output demand, where demand is positively related to home output
price competitiveness and negatively related to the home real interest
rate, computed by the home CPI. Equations (3) and (3*) are typical
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price-misperception aggregate supply functions. These supply
functions could be based on consumer prices as opposed to home
output price, adding feedback channels (via the exchange rate and
foreign prices) and greater algebraic detail, but without changing our
general conclusions. Therefore, for comparison with the literature cited
in the introduction and at the beginning of this section, only home
output price is included in the supply function.
Equations (4) and (4*) are the demand functions for real money
balances in each economy. The income elasticity of money demand is
assumed to be unity as a mere simplification which has no substantive
impact on our results. Although the anticipated non-home interest rate
could be included in equations (4) and (4*), this would add an
additional feedback channel and greatly complicate the already
burdensome algebra without affecting our general conclusions. The
term represents an exogenous shift in home asset preferences, when
positive, from home bonds to home money.
Equations (5) and (5*) are the demand flow functions for home
and foreign bonds, where home (foreign) bond demand depends
positively on the home (foreign) yield and negatively on the expected
foreign (home) yield. Both home and foreign bonds are normal goods
in that there is a positive relationship between demand and income.
When positive, 𝜉𝑡 represents an exogenous portfolio shift from foreign
bonds to home bonds. Branson and Henderson (1984) have provided a
detailed explanation of the derivation of, and the assumptions inherent
in, asset demand functions such as these. As a further assumption
here, it is assumed that the interest elasticity of bond demand is
greater than the interest elasticity of money demand. This assumption
precludes an ambiguous exchange rate effect of money demand
shocks.
Finally, equations (6) through (8*) represent the money supply
rules. In equation (6), the home money supply is a function of
systematic intervention by home and foreign authorities in the foreign
exchange market and home sterilization, as reflected by changes in
foreign reserves and domestic credit. If 𝜃1 > 0, a depreciation of the
home currency [(𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑡−1 ) > 0 ] leads the domestic authority to sell
foreign reserves and the foreign authority to buy foreign reserves,
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e.g., leaning with the wind. Further, 𝜃1 = ∞ represents a fixed or
pegged exchange rate regime; 𝜃1 > 0, a flexible regime; and 0 < |𝜃1 | <
∞, a managed regime.
The exchange market intervention envisioned here is that in
which the monetary authority intervenes simply by buying or selling
the other country's currency (in effect, exchanging reserves).1 The
intervention action of the foreign (home) authority is not necessarily
immediately and fully sterilized by the home (foreign) authority, and
thus affects the home (foreign) money supply. As an example,
consider the case where 𝜃1 = 0, 𝜃1∗ > 0. If the home currency
appreciates (𝑒𝑡 decreases), the foreign authority sells foreign reserves

(∆𝑓𝑡∗ < 0). As shown in equations (6) and (6*), the foreign money
supply decreases and the home money supply increases.
Consequently, the money supplies are linearly dependent. The
implication of this for optimal intervention solutions is addressed in
greater detail later in the paper.
In equations (8) and (8*), domestic credit is affected by the
degree of sterilization, determined by the offset coefficients 𝜃2 and 𝜃2∗ .
If 𝜃2 = 1, exchange market intervention is fully sterilized. If 𝜃2 = 0, no
sterilization is conducted and the home money supply responds to
unanticipated exchange rate movements to a degree determined by
the intervention parameters 𝜃1 and 𝜃1∗ . Finally if 0 < 𝜃2 < 1, the
exchange market intervention is partially sterilized. Note that the
exchange market intervention conducted by the foreign authority is
not assumed to be automatically sterilized. Hence, intervention by the
foreign authority affects the home money supply, and the home
authority can use sterilization operations as an instrument even when
the home authority does not conduct exchange market intervention.
Obviously, domestic credit could be conditioned upon a host of
other variables, increasing the number of instruments available to the
monetary authorities. However, the objectives of the monetary
authorities could be increased as well. We choose here to focus
specifically on exchange rate intervention and sterilization.
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Equilibrium Conditions and Solutions
For each country, the current account surplus less capital
outflows equals changes in official reserves. Aggregating the balance
of payments equations and ignoring interest rate effects on trade
balances [as in Benavie (1983)], the external equilibrium condition, or
difference between changes in official reserves, can be expressed as:

∆𝑓𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑡∗ = ℎ1 (𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ) + ℎ2 (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡∗ ) − ℎ3 (𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡 ) + 𝜉𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡∗ ,
(9)
where ℎ1 ≡ 2𝑎1 , ℎ2 ≡ 2(𝑔1 + 𝑔2 ), ℎ3 ≡ 4𝑔2 , and, for mere convenience,
𝑔4 is assumed equal to one half. Note that if uncovered interest parity
were to hold, ℎ2 and ℎ3 would approach infinity in value. In the bulk of
our analysis, it is assumed that there is some degree of capital
mobility, but uncovered interest parity does not hold.
The five equilibrium conditions can now be used to solve for the
five endogenous variables, 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡∗ , 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡∗ , and 𝑒𝑡 . Setting home (foreign)
money demand equal to home (foreign) money supply (the LM
equation) yields expressions for 𝑟𝑡 ( 𝑟𝑡∗ ). These expressions are
substituted into the remaining three equilibrium conditions for the
home goods market, foreign goods market, and the external
equilibrium condition given in equation (9). Solutions are proposed for
the remaining three endogenous variables:
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝑝𝑡 = 𝜋10 + 𝜋11 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋11
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋12 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋12
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋13 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋13
𝜇𝑡 +
∗
∗
𝜋14 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋15 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋15 𝑚𝑡−1 ,

(10)

𝑝𝑡∗

∗ ∗
𝜋21
𝜂𝑡

= 𝜋20 + 𝜋21 𝜂𝑡 +
𝜋24 𝜉𝑡 +

∗ ∗
+ 𝜋22 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋22
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋23 𝜇𝑡
∗
∗
𝜇25 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋25
𝑚𝑡−1
,

+

∗ ∗
𝜋23
𝜇𝑡

+
(11)

∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜇30 + 𝜋31 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋31
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋32 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋32
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋33 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋33
𝜇𝑡 +
∗
∗
𝜋34 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋35 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋35 𝑚𝑡−1 .

(12)
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Explicit and implicit solutions for the coefficients are provided in the
Appendix. The exchange rate solution is provided below to facilitate
the presentation of policy outcomes.

Exchange Rate Solution
After solving for the ’s above, the exchange rate solution can be
expressed as:

𝑒𝑡 = [𝛽1 (𝜂𝑡 − 𝜂𝑡∗ ) − 𝛿1 (𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡∗ ) − 𝛿2 𝜉𝑡 − 𝛿3 (𝜌𝑡 − 𝜌𝑡∗ )]Δ−1 + 𝑚𝑡−1
∗
− 𝑚𝑡−1
,
(13)
where

Δ ≡ −𝛿2 {𝛽2 − [2 − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )} +
𝛽1 [2𝛽5 − 𝛽6 (1 − 𝜃2 )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ ) − 𝛽6 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )],
and 𝛽 ˊ𝑠 the 𝛿 ˊ𝑠 and are identities provided in the Appendix.
Examining the domestic shock terms, we find that a positive
domestic goods demand shock has an ambiguous effect on the
exchange rate. The increased goods demand, and thus relative price
effect, leads to a home currency depreciation, yet the effect of a
higher interest rate leads to a home currency appreciation. If it is
assumed that there is a relatively high degree of capital mobility, then
𝛽1 < 0, and a positive goods demand shock causes a home currency
appreciation. Given the assumption that the interest elasticity of bond
demand exceeds the interest elasticity of money demand, a positive
money demand shock causes a home currency appreciation through
both the goods and portfolio channel. A positive portfolio shock,
representing an exogenous shift to home bonds from foreign bonds,
causes the home currency to appreciate. Finally, a positive supply
shock causes the home currency to appreciate through a
competitiveness effect (falling home prices make home output more
competitive), to depreciate through an income effect (increased
demand for foreign output), and to appreciate through a portfolio
effect (similar to a money demand shock).
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As 𝜃1 and 𝜃1∗ increase (greater degree of systematic
intervention), Δ increases, meaning that the exchange rate is less
responsive to the shocks described above. Further, it is apparent in
this solution that foreign exchange intervention affects the exchange
rate, even if the intervention action is fully sterilized (𝜃2 and 𝜃2∗ = 1).

III. Policy Objectives and Instrument Interaction
The optimal exchange intervention and sterilization actions of
the two policymakers are determined from the minimization of
individual loss functions defined as the equally weighted average of
the variance of output around its full information level and of the
variance of unanticipated consumer price inflation. Thus as in
Tumovsky et al. (1988), the home loss function is defined as [using
equation (3)]:

1
1
𝐿 = Var[𝑎3 (𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑝𝑡 ) + 𝜌𝑡 ] + Var(𝑐𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑐𝑡 ),
2
2

(14)

and the foreign loss function as [using equation (3*)]:

1
1
𝐿∗ = Var[𝑎3 (𝑝𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑝𝑡∗ ) + 𝜌𝑡∗ ] + Var(𝑐𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑐𝑡∗ )
2
2

(14*)
In many articles on optimal foreign exchange intervention, it is
assumed that the home authority automatically and fully sterilizes
foreign intervention and does not sterilize own intervention, and vice
versa. This setup creates asymmetric money supply rules, allowing for
a nash approach. However, if it is not assumed that this asymmetry
automatically occurs, the money supplies and intervention coefficients
are linearly dependent and a nash equilibrium does not exist. This
issue is discussed and proved in Lane (1989).
Therefore, the model employed here, as that in Lane (1989),
does not have a unique Nash solution for both intervention
coefficients. There are an infinite number of Nash equilibrium
combinations of intervention coefficients (𝜃1 and 𝜃1∗ ) that yield the
same level of optimal intervention. Thus, it is impossible to derive
unique values for both intervention coefficients. Therefore, we
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examine two cases which determine the intervention rule for one
authority (as this "ties down" the value of one of the intervention
coefficients) and highlight the role of sterilization policies in noncooperative contexts. Both cases use a Stackelberg approach [see
Canzoneri and Henderson (1992), Chapter 2; Lane (1989)], with the
home policymaker regarded as the leader (perhaps as the reserve
currency country), choosing its intervention rule (𝜃1 ) first. Once the
intervention regime is chosen by the leader country, unique
sterilization coefficients can be determined.
The first case models that where the home country determines
its optimal degree of foreign exchange intervention (making
intervention on the part of the foreign authority moot and thus 𝜃1∗ =
0), leaving the home and foreign authorities to choose their optimal
degree of sterilization. The second example considers the case where
the home authority pegs the exchange rate (𝜃1 = ∞). Again, the home
and foreign authority determine their sterilization actions in a noncooperative fashion.

IV. Case 1: Optimal Intervention Leader
Initially, we consider the case where the home authority is the
leader, determining its optimal degree of intervention by minimizing
the loss function given in equation (14). The home and foreign
authorities then determine their respective optimal degree of
sterilization, considering the exchange intervention of the home
authority, again minimizing the loss functions in (14) and (14*). The
home authority, therefore, has two instruments with which to minimize
the two-part loss function. The foreign authority, in a sense, borrows
the intervention conducted by the home authority and fine tunes it
with its own sterilization action.

Policy Interaction
Before computing the optimal settings for 𝜃1 , 𝜃2 , and 𝜃2∗ , it is
worthwhile to consider the home response functions. In doing so, the
strategic interaction of the home and foreign policy instruments can be
determined. Using the taxonomy provided by Lane (1990), policies can
be classified as strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Lane
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described foreign exchange intervention policies as strategic
substitutes if intervention by one country leads to less intervention by
the other country. As Lane pointed out, this case can lead to multiple
equilibria, but the alternatives cannot be Pareto ranked. If foreign
exchange policies are strategic complements, then intervention by one
country results in greater intervention by the other country. This case
leads to multiple equilibria which can possibly be Pareto ranked, and
may provide for Pareto improving coordination of policies.
Marston (1980), using a two-country model of the financial
sector, examined the role of sterilization policies in modifying balances
of payments disturbances. Marston showed that sterilization by the
(home) country conducting the intervention, reduces the variance of
the home interest rate but increases the flow of foreign reserve flows.
Further, sterilization by the foreign country also increases the reserve
flows of the home country. This indirectly implies that home
sterilization and home intervention are complementary policies, and
foreign sterilization and home intervention are complementary polices.
The direct relationship between foreign sterilization and home
sterilization was not examined by Marston.
In the analysis here, the optimal policy response functions of
the home authority result from the minimization of the home loss
function, [equation (14)]. They indicate the general relationships
among the three instruments. The response functions are:

𝜃2 = 1 − (1 − 𝜃2∗ )

(1+𝑎32 )Κ2
(1+𝑎32 )Κ1 +(𝛽4 −𝛽5 )Κ3

,
(15)

and

𝜃1 = (1 − 𝜃2∗ )−1

(1+𝑎32 )Κ1 +(𝛽4 −𝛽5 )𝛿3 Κ3
𝛽6 Κ3

,
(16)

where

𝛫1 ≡ {𝛿4 𝛿3 𝜎𝜌2 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑎3 [𝛽1 𝜎𝜂2∗ + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝛿1 𝜎𝜇2∗ + 𝛿3 (1 +
𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜎𝜌2∗ ]},
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𝛫2 ≡ {𝛿5 𝛿3 𝜎𝜌2
− (1 − 𝛼)𝑎3 [𝛽1 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝛿1 𝜎𝜇2 + 𝛿3 (1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜎𝜌2 ]}
and

𝛫3 ≡ 𝛿3 {(2𝛼 − 1)𝜎𝜌2 + 𝑎32 [𝛼𝜎𝜌2 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜎𝜌2∗ ]}
Equations (15) and (16) indicate a positive relationship among
instruments (𝜕𝜃2 ∕ 𝜕𝜃2∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜃1 ∕ 𝜕𝜃2∗ > 0). Hence, home
sterilization policies and foreign sterilization policies are strategic
complements, because increasing sterilization by the foreign authority
generates greater sterilization by the home authority. To understand
this relationship, consider the case where the home central bank is
intervening by buying the foreign currency. This has the indirect effect
of decreasing the foreign money supply and increasing the home
money supply. To offset this, the foreign sterilization operation
expands the foreign money supply and the home sterilization operation
contracts the home money supply. However, because the foreign
sterilization operation is inflationary for both economies, the home
central bank must contract the home money supply by a greater
extent to offset the foreign policy action and vice versa.
Foreign sterilization and home intervention are strategic
complements as well; increasing sterilization by the foreign authority
leads to greater intervention by the home authority. This outcome
follows the logic presented above. As the foreign country offsets
central bank purchases of the foreign currency, it undertakes an
expansionary or inflationary policy. This, in turn, puts additional
downward pressure on the foreign currency, necessitating greater
purchases by the home authority.

Optimal Policy
In this section, the optimal policy solutions are derived for the
three policy instruments. After substitution of the foreign reaction
function into the home loss function, equation (14), the optimal setting
for home intervention is:
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𝜃1 =

[𝛿7 𝛽6 −𝛿6 (𝛽4 −𝛽5 )]𝛫3 +𝛿6 (1+𝑎32 )(𝛫1 +𝛫2 )+𝛽6 (1−𝛼)𝑎3 (1+𝑎32 )𝛫4
2𝛿2 𝛽6 𝛫3

,
(17)

and for home sterilization

𝜃2 = 1 −

2𝛿2 (1+𝑎32 )𝛫2
,
2
𝛿6 (1+𝑎3 )(𝛫1 +𝛫2 )+𝛽6 (1−𝛼)𝑎3 (1+𝑎32 )𝛫4 +[𝛿7 𝛽6 +𝛿6 (𝛽4 +𝛽5 )]𝛫3

(18)
where

𝛫4 ≡ [𝛽12 (𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜂2∗ ) + 𝛿32 (𝜎𝜌2 + 𝜎𝜌2∗ ) + 𝛿12 (𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜎𝜇2∗ ) + 𝛿22 𝜎𝜉2 ].
Substituting these solutions into the foreign loss function results in the
optimal solution for the foreign authority's sterilization coefficient,
which is:

𝜃2∗ = 1 −

2𝛿2 [(1+𝑎32 )𝛫1 +(𝛽4 −𝛽5 )𝛫3 ]
𝛿6 (1+𝑎32 )(𝛫1 +𝛫2 )+𝛽6 (1−𝛼)𝑎3 (1+𝑎32 )𝛫4 +[𝛿7 𝛽6 −𝛿6 (𝛽4 −𝛽5 )]𝛫3

.

(19)
The solutions above indicate that, in general, a managed float with
incomplete sterilization is optimal.2 By examining each shock
individually, the source of policy tension in this model can be
highlighted. The optimal outcomes for goods demand, money demand,
and portfolio shocks are provided in Table 1 below and discussed
subsequently. Supply shocks are detailed individually.
For goods demand, money demand, and portfolio shocks, the
optimal intervention solution is a peg, i.e.,𝜃1 = ∞ , and the sterilization
solutions are symmetric across countries. For an exogenous portfolio
shift, full sterilization by both authorities is optimal. A shift in bond
demand is met with a like shift in relative money supplies through the
intervention action. Fully sterilizing this intervention eliminates
domestic and foreign price innovations [𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑝𝑡∗ ].
For goods demand, or money demand shocks originating from
abroad, full sterilization is optimal. With the exchange rate pegged, full
sterilization by the home authority makes the home price innovation
equivalent to the foreign price innovation. By adjusting the foreign
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money supply (less than full sterilization by the foreign authority), the
foreign authority eliminates, simultaneously, foreign and domestic
price innovations. If the shock originates domestically, less than full
sterilization by the home authority is optimal. The pegged exchange
rate and complete sterilization by the foreign policymaker eliminates
exchange rate innovations and makes foreign price innovations
equivalent to home price innovations. Allowing the home money
supply to adjust (less than complete sterilization) simultaneously
eliminates home and foreign price innovations.
Even though an asymmetric policymaking environment exists,
symmetric policy outcomes result for the shocks examined so far. This
is because, without supply shocks, there are three objectives, home
and foreign price innovations and the exchange rate innovation. There
are also three instruments, 𝜃1 , 𝜃2 , and 𝜃2∗ . With the exchange rate
pegged, each authority should eliminate the inflationary or deflationary
consequences of shocks which originate in the domestic economy
through appropriate adjustment of their money supplies. In other
words, if the shock originates domestically, the domestic authority
should allow the domestic money supply to adjust, i.e., not fully
sterilize.
As noted earlier in the description of equation (9), ℎ2 and
ℎ3 increase with greater substitutability of bonds, approaching unity in
the limit. As a result, for a goods demand shock, sterilization increases
also. Not as apparent, optimal sterilization increases for a money
shock as well. As seen in equations (4) and (5), the money shock
represents a shift from domestic bonds to domestic money. In the
limit, the optimal solution for the case of a money shock is identical to
that of the goods demand shock. Therefore, we find that increasing
capital market integration can, in a competitive policymaking
environment, lead to policies which generate greater reserve flows.
Turning to the supply shocks, we see that they are the sources
of tension and asymmetry in the analysis here. The intervention
solution for the foreign supply shock is 𝜃1 = [ℎ3 𝑎4 + ℎ2 + 𝑎2 (ℎ3 − ℎ2 )] ∕
2𝑎2 𝑎3 (𝑎4 + 1). This outcome illustrates how supply shocks complicate
policymaking by making an exchange rate peg suboptimal. There are
now three objectives in the loss function of the home authority, home
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and foreign price innovations, and exchange rate innovations, and four
in the loss function of the foreign authority, foreign output innovations,
home and foreign price innovations, and exchange rate innovations.
There remain, however, only three instruments. Foreign exchange
intervention can no longer be directed at exchange rate innovations
alone and, thus, a pegged exchange rate is suboptimal.
It is, however, still optimal for the home authority to completely
sterilize, 𝜃2 = 1, its foreign exchange intervention. However, the
foreign authority now finds it suboptimal to use sterilization actions
solely to smooth foreign price innovations, as foreign output will still
change in light of the supply shock. The optimal degree of sterilization
which results is 𝜃2∗ = 1 − 2[(1 + 2𝑎32 )(𝑎4 + 𝑎2 ) + 𝑎2 𝑎3 (𝑎4 + 1)][ℎ3 𝑎4 +
ℎ2 + 𝑎2 (ℎ3 − ℎ2 )]−1 . For these outcomes, greater bond substitutability
increases the optimal degree of intervention, driving 𝜃1 to infinity
(pegged rate) in the limit. Further, greater substitutability increases
the optimal degree of foreign sterilization, reaching complete
sterilization in the limit 𝜃2∗ = 1.
The optimal solutions in light of a foreign supply shock are more
complicated and given in equations (20)—(22). The optimal
intervention solution is:

𝜃1 =

𝛫5
2𝑎2 (𝑎4 +1)[(2𝛼−1)+𝛼𝑎32 ]

,
(20)

where

𝛫5 ≡ 𝑎4 [𝑎32 𝛼 + (2𝛼 − 1)][𝛽6 (𝛽2 − 𝛽1 ) + 𝛽3 (𝛽5 − 𝛽4 )] +
𝑎4 𝛿6 (1 + 𝑎32 ) + (1 + 𝑎32 )𝑎3 (1 − 𝛼)[𝛽6 ℎ2 − 𝛽3 (𝑎4 + 𝑎2 )].
Equation (20) shows that the home authority allows partial adjustment
for this shock as well. The solution for the optimal degree of home
sterilization is:

2(1 + 𝑎32 )[𝑎1 𝑎4 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑎2 ]
𝜃2 = 1 −
𝛫5
(21)
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and for foreign sterilization,

𝜃2∗ = 1 −

2[𝛽4 +𝑎22 𝛽5 +(2𝑎32 +1)𝛼(𝛽4 −𝛽5 )]
𝛫5

.
(22)

When the supply shock originates in the home economy, the home
authority uses its exchange rate intervention and sterilization
operations to export the effects of the supply shock. The foreign
authority must respond by adjusting its money supply (less than full
sterilization). Increasing substitutability of bonds again increases the
optimal degree of intervention, leading to a pegged rate (𝜃1 = ∞) with
perfect substitutability. Also, the optimal degree of sterilization
increases with increased substitutability of bonds, with full sterilization
optimal in the limit (𝜃2 and 𝜃2∗ = 1).
This leader-intervention case reveals the competitive
relationship of sterilization policies and intervention policies. Increased
sterilization by the foreign authority generates greater sterilization and
intervention by the home authority. As demonstrated by Marston
(1980), this relationship between sterilization and intervention can
cause greater variability of reserves. The positive relationship between
sterilization policies is established here and adds even further to the
problem of reserve instability.
It is also shown here that increased international substitutability
of assets compounds this problem. With perfect capital mobility, ℎ2 and
ℎ3 approach infinity, as explained below equation (9). As a result, the
loss functions described in equations (14) and (14*) reduce to three
elements, home price innovations, foreign price innovations, and
exchange rate innovations. The loss functions of the two authorities
are minimized when the exchange rate is pegged, and money supplies
are (trend) stationary, which comes about with full sterilization. The
case where the leader pegs the exchange rate is examined next.
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V. Case 2: Fixed Exchange Rate Leader
In this second case, it is assumed that the home authority elects
to peg the exchange rate. Therefore, 𝜃1 = ∞. The optimal sterilization
coefficients of the home and foreign authorities are determined, taking
𝜃1 = ∞ as given, in a competitive manner. The reaction functions
which result in this case display the same relationship between
instruments as in the first case; that is, home and foreign sterilization
operations are strategic complements. Because of space consideration
they are not provided here.
The optimal sterilization coefficients for the home and foreign
authorities are:

𝜃2 = 1 − 2
𝛿2 {(2𝛼 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝑎32 )𝛫6 + 𝑎3 𝛿3 [(𝛼𝛿5 + 𝑎32 𝛽5 )𝜎𝜌2∗ + (𝛼𝛿4 + 𝑎32 𝛽4 )𝜎𝜌2 ]}
(𝛼 + 𝑎32 ){(2𝛼 − 1)[𝛽6 𝛫4 − 𝛿6 (𝛫6 + 𝛫7 )] + 𝛿2 𝛿6 𝑎3 𝛿3 (𝜎𝜌2 + 𝜎𝜌2∗ )}
(23)
and

𝜃2 = 1 − 2
𝛿2 {(2𝛼 − 1)(𝛼 +
+ 𝑎3 𝛿3 [(𝛼𝛿5 + 𝑎32 𝛽5 )𝜎𝜌2 + (𝛼𝛿4 + 𝑎32 𝛽4 )𝜎𝜌2∗ ]}
,
(𝛼 + 𝑎32 ){(2𝛼 − 1)[𝛽6 𝛫4 − 𝛿6 (𝛫6 + 𝛫7 )] + 𝛿2 𝛿6 𝑎3 𝛿3 (𝜎𝜌2 + 𝜎𝜌2∗ )}
𝑎32 )𝛫7

(24)
where

𝛫6 = 𝛽1 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝛿1 𝜎𝜇2 + 𝛿3 (1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜎𝜌2
and

𝛫7 = 𝛽1 𝜎𝜂2∗ + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝛿1 𝜎𝜇2∗ + 𝛿3 (1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜎𝜌2∗ .
As in the previous case, the solutions above show, in general, optimal
sterilization to be less than complete. Considering the outcome for
specific shocks, we find the solutions for goods demand, money
demand and portfolio shocks to be identical to the previous case. This
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 49, No. 1 (January 1997): pg. 43-60. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

outcome is logical because, for these particular shocks, it was optimal
for the home authority to peg the exchange rate as it is here.
The supply shocks, however, yield quite different solutions. For
a home country supply shock, the optimal sterilization coefficients are:

𝜃2 = (2𝛼−1)[𝑎

2𝑎4 [(2𝛼−1)(𝑎2 +𝑎4 )+𝛿2 𝑎4 𝑎3 ]

2 ,
2 (1+𝑎4 )ℎ2 −(ℎ2 +ℎ3 𝑎4 )(𝑎2 +𝑎4 )]+𝛿6 𝑎4 𝑎3

(25)
and

𝜃2∗ = (2𝛼−1)[𝑎

2𝛿2 𝑎4 𝑎3
2
2 (1+𝑎4 )ℎ2 −(ℎ2 +ℎ3 𝑎4 )(𝑎2 +𝑎4 )]+𝛿6 𝑎4 𝑎3

.
(26)

The solution for 𝜃2 is different than in the first case as the exchange
rate is being pegged by the home authority as opposed to managed;
nonetheless, the home authority finds partial sterilization to be
optimal. Likewise, less than full sterilization is optimal for the foreign
authority. As in the previous outcomes, the optimal degree of home
sterilization increases with greater international substitutability of
assets, approaching unity in the limit.
For a foreign country supply shock, the optimal degree of
sterilization coefficients for the home and foreign authorities are
symmetric to those above, contrasting the competitive case with the
leadership case described previously.3 As in the previous case, though,
less than full sterilization is, in general, optimal.

VI. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, the optimal sterilization procedures have been
determined for two-country leadership flexible and leadership fixed
exchange-rate regimes. These solutions indicate that, in general, less
than full sterilization is optimal. It also has been shown that
sterilization policies are strategic complements between the two
countries and strategic complements with intervention policies.
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Therefore, in a competitive policymaking environment, greater use of
sterilization leads to both increased sterilization by the other authority
and greater exchange intervention. The result is increased reserve
flows and possibly explosive reserve flows [Mastropasqua et al. (1988,
p. 270)]. Greater substitutability of assets internationally generates
further sterilization and, therefore, compounds this problem.
The somewhat common practice of automatic and complete
sterilization of own and other country interventions should therefore
be questioned, even in an environment where sterilized intervention is
(theoretically) effective. Given that sterilization policies are strategic
complements, it may be possible to coordinate sterilization policies and
avoid excessive reserve variability. This issue is, however, beyond the
scope of analysis presented here.
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Notes
1. The various ways in which exchange market intervention is conducted and
financed is detailed in Humpage (1994). What is envisioned here is
intervention along the lines of the example in Batten and Ott (1984).
2. Given the symmetry assumed in the model and loss functions examined
here, if the home authority were to surrender intervention to the foreign
authority, the optimal instrument settings which would result would be
symmetric to those of the first case.
3. Solutions for a pegged-rate regime, where the home authority acts as a
leader in determining the optimal degree of sterilization, are available from
the author upon request.
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Appendix
Model Solutions
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜋10 + 𝜋11 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋11
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋12 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋12
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋13 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋13
𝜇𝑡
∗
∗
+ 𝜋14 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋15 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋15 𝑚𝑡−1
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝑃𝑡∗ = 𝜋20 + 𝜋21 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋21
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋22 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋22
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋23 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋23 𝜇𝑡∗
∗
∗
+ 𝜋24 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋25 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋25
𝑚𝑡−1
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜋30 + 𝜋31 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋31
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋32 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋32
𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋33 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋33
𝜇𝑡
∗
∗
+ 𝜋34 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋35 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋35
𝑚𝑡−1
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𝜋10 = 𝜋20 = 𝜋30 = 0
∗
∗
∗
𝜋15 = 𝜋25
= 𝜋35 = 1, 𝜋25 = 𝜋15
= 0, 𝜋35
= 1,
∗
∗
∗
𝜋16 = 𝜋26
= 𝜋36 = 1, 𝜋26 = 𝜋16
= 1, 𝜋36
= 1,

𝜋11 = {𝛽4 [𝛽2 + 2 − (2 − 𝜃2 − 𝜃2∗ )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )]
− 𝛽1 [2 − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )}∆−1
∗
𝜋11
= {𝛽5 [𝛽2 + 2 − (2 − 𝜃2 − 𝜃2∗ )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )]
− 𝛽1 [2 − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )}∆−1

𝜋12 = −𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝜋11 − (1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋13
∗
∗
𝜋12
= −𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝜋11
− (1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋13

𝜋13 = −{(𝛽4 − 𝛽5 ) − [𝛽4 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽5 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )}∆−1
𝜋14 = −(1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋11
∗
∗
𝜋14
= −(1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋11
∗
𝜋21 = 𝜋11
∗
𝜋21
= 𝜋11

𝜋22 = −𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝜋21 − (1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋13
∗
∗
𝜋22
= −𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝜋21
− (1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋13

𝜋23 = −{(𝛽5 − 𝛽4 ) − [𝛽5 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽4 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )}∆−1
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𝜋24 = −(1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋21
∗
∗
𝜋24
= −(1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋21
∗
𝜋31 = −𝜋31
= 𝛽1 ∆−1
∗
𝜋32 = −𝜋32
= −(1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋31 + ℎ2 𝑎4−1 𝜋33
∗
𝜋33 = −𝜋33
= −𝑎2 𝑎4−1 𝜋31 + (1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )𝜋33

𝜋34 = −(𝛽4 + 𝛽5 )∆−1
∆≡ −𝛿2 {𝛽2 − [2 − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2 ) − 𝛽3 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )](𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )}
+ 𝛽1 [2𝛽5 − 𝛽6 (1 − 𝜃2 )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )
− 𝛽6 (1 − 𝜃2∗ )(𝜃1 + 𝜃1∗ )]
Identities

𝛽1 ≡ ℎ1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 (1 + 𝑎3 )
𝛽2 ≡ ℎ1 + ℎ3
𝛽3 ≡ ℎ2 𝑎4−1 + ℎ3
𝛽4 ≡ 𝑎3 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 (1 + 𝑎3 ) + 𝛼𝑎2
𝛽5 ≡ 𝑎1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑎2
𝛽6 ≡ 𝑎2 (1 + 𝑎4−1 )
𝛽7 ≡ (𝛽42 − 𝛽52 )
𝛿1 ≡ 𝛽1 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 − (𝛽4 + 𝛽5 )(1 − ℎ2 𝑎4−1 )
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𝛿2 ≡ 𝛽4 + 𝛽5
𝛿3 ≡ 𝛽1 (1 + 𝑎2 𝑎4−1 ) + (𝛽4 + 𝛽5 )ℎ2 𝑎4−1
𝛿4 ≡ 𝛼𝛽4 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽5
𝛿5 ≡ (1 − 𝛼)𝛽4 + 𝛼𝛽5
𝛿6 ≡ 𝛽1 𝛽6 + 𝛿2 𝛽3
𝛿7 ≡ 𝛽2 𝛿2 − 2𝛽1 𝛽5
Table 1
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